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MOVING STEADILY OR GREAT LEAP 
FORWARD? THE EMERGING CARBON 
MARKET IN CHINA 
YING SHEN∗ 
China has become a large greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions source due to 
its rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. Given the heavy environmental 
footprint caused by China’s economic growth, the Chinese government has 
recognised the need to control carbon emissions and mitigate climate 
change. Indeed, China has made remarkable progress in reducing its 
energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product (‘GDP’). However, 
these improvements are mainly the result of the most readily available 
abatement options. Given that simple solutions have almost been exhausted, 
cost-effective market-based instruments such as carbon emissions trading 
and carbon markets have become the focus of the Chinese leadership’s 
attention and have begun to emerge and develop in China. At this stage the 
primary issue that must be considered by the Chinese government is how to 
implement an emissions trading scheme (‘ETS’) — whether to adopt such a 
new environmental policy instrument step by step in an evolutionary 
manner or whether to fully implement it instantly in a revolutionary way. 
This article considers the future direction of an emerging carbon market in 
China. It first provides a comprehensive and up-to-date review of current 
pilot ETS programs in China. Based on the review of these programs, 
China’s pilot ETS programs and the well-established European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (‘EU ETS’) are compared. The improvements 
made by, and the shortcomings of, these pilot programs (which could be 
considered by the Chinese government in choosing an appropriate 
development model of the ETS in the near future) are summarised. The 
article concludes by assessing the prospects of an ETS in China.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The mitigation of carbon emissions has been the subject of gradual policy 
development in the international community in recent years.1 China, as the 
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world’s most populous and largest developing country, has become a major 
greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions source due to its rapid industrialisation 
and urbanisation.2 Air pollution within China today, however, is endangering 
the lives of its citizens and sapping the nation’s economic vitality. The heavy 
environmental impact of its economic growth, has forced the Chinese 
government to recognise the need to control carbon emissions and mitigate 
climate change. In the past five years, China has made remarkable progress, 
achieving an almost 20 per cent reduction in energy consumption per unit of 
gross domestic product (‘GDP’), 3 thereby contributing to the reduction of 
carbon emissions. However, this significant improvement is a result largely of 
the large-scale decommissioning of inefficient power plants, which is one of 
the most readily available abatement options to reduce China’s carbon 
intensity.4 Since simple solutions have almost been exhausted,5 it seems that 
achieving improvements on a similar scale will become increasingly difficult 
and challenging in the future. In this context, cost-effective market-based 
instruments have become the focus of attention for Chinese leaders; in 
particular, carbon emissions trading and carbon markets are beginning to 
emerge and develop in China. 
                                                                                                                    
1  The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’) 
recognised the principle of the global cost-effectiveness of emissions reduction, opening the 
way for tradable permits. In December 1997, industrialised countries and countries with 
economies in transition, also known as ‘Annex I countries’, agreed to a legally binding 
commitment at the third meeting of the Conference of Parties held in Kyoto, negotiating a 
legal framework as a protocol to the UNFCCC — the Kyoto Protocol. See United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (entered into force 21 March 1994); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 
(entered into force 16 February 2005). 
2 According to a recent inventory of the International Energy Agency (‘IEA’), China is now the 
world’s largest source of fossil fuel energy-related GHG emissions, surpassing the United 
States (‘US’). See IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights (OECD/IEA, 
2012) 24. 
3  Andreas Tuerk et al, ‘Emerging Carbon Markets: Experience, Trends, and Challenges’ 
(Working Paper, Climate Strategies, 1 January 2013) 12 <http://www.climatestrategies. 
org/research/our-reports/category/63/370.html>. 
4 Under severe scrutiny towards the end of 2010, data showed that many energy managers 
stopped or slowed production rather than improving efficiency to achieve their targets of 
lowering energy intensity. This resulted in a slight ‘rebound’ of energy intensity in early 
2011. See Jane A Leggett, ‘China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies’ (CRS 
Report for Congress No R41919, Congressional Research Service, 2011) 16.  
5 In addition to the closure of thousands of small, inefficient and polluting coal-fired power 
plants, iron and steel mills, cement kilns, aluminium plants, etc, China has also tried to 
increase its share of non-fossil energy through using clean and renewable energy, such as 
wind power. The Chinese government has also tried other solutions, such as storing carbon in 
forests, improving the enforcement of standards, giving monetary awards for energy-saving 
achievements by companies and public institutions and tightening efficiency standards for 
buildings and appliances. See Leggett, above n 4, 17. 
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Mr Deng Xiaoping, the chief designer of China’s modernisation drive, once 
quoted the proverb of ‘crossing the river by groping for stones’ when facing 
the challenges of economic reform.6 As a metaphor for progress it implies 
moving steadily while trying new things. As a brand new environmental 
policy instrument, the emissions trading scheme (‘ETS’) is presenting new 
challenges for the Chinese government. How to implement the ETS in China 
— either by adopting this market-based environmental policy instrument 
steadily in a gradual and evolutionary manner, or fully implementing it 
instantly in the revolutionary manner of the Great Leap Forward7 — is the 
primary issue that must be considered by the Chinese government at this 
stage. This article considers the future direction of an emerging carbon market 
in China. It first provides a comprehensive and up-to-date review of current 
pilot ETS programs in China. Seven pilot regions in China are divided into 
three groups: first movers (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong); pilot regions 
with official implementation plans (Tianjin, Hubei and Shenzhen); and the 
pilot region without an official implementation plan (Chongqing). Based on 
the review of these pilot ETS programs, China’s pilot programs are compared 
with the well-established European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(‘EU ETS’). The improvements made by, and the shortcomings of, these pilot 
programs, which could be considered by the Chinese government in choosing 
an appropriate development model of the ETS in the near future, are then 
summarised. The article concludes by assessing the prospects of an ETS in 
China.  
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, the political slogan of ‘crossing the river by groping for stones’ was first 
proposed by Chen Yun on 7 April 1950 and was mentioned several times at a series of central 
conferences. On 16 December 1980, Chen Yun pointed out at the Central Working 
Conference that reform in China should be kept steady like a person crossing a river by 
groping for stones, which Deng Xiaoping completely agreed with. This political slogan was 
later promoted by Deng Xiaoping in the article ‘Reform is China’s Second Revolution’ on 28 
March 1985 and is deemed to be one of the classic quotations from Deng Xiaoping. See 陈云 
[Chen Yun], 《陈云文选第 3卷》 [Selected Works of Chen Yun Volume III] (人民出版社 
[People’s Publishing House], 1993) 279; 邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping], 《邓小平文选第 3卷》
[Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume III] (人民出版社 [People’s Publishing House], 
1993) 174. 
7 The Great Leap Forward in Chinese history dates back to the ‘planned economy’ period, 
which was an economic and social campaign launched by the Communist Party of China 
between 1958 and 1960. It aimed at transforming China from an agrarian economy into a 
modern communist society through the process of rapid industrialisation and agricultural 
collectivisation. For more information on the Great Leap Forward, see Theodore Shabad, 
‘China’s “Great Leap Forward”’ (1959) 28(7) Far Eastern Survey 105, 105–9.  
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II INITIATING PILOT PROGRAMS FOR CARBON EMISSIONS 
TRADING IN CHINA 
The Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s Republic of China (2011–2015)8 foreshadows 
the development of carbon emissions trading, anticipating the ‘step by step 
establishment of carbon emissions trading markets’9 so as to ‘give full play to 
the fundamental role of the market mechanism in optimizing the allocation of 
resources, and realize the objective of controlling greenhouse gas emissions at 
minimum cost’.10 Based on this Outline, carbon emissions trading is being 
tested through specific pilot programs in parts of China. When discussing the 
initiative pilot programs of carbon emissions trading in China, it is necessary 
to clarify two types of ETS. The first is voluntary emissions trading, which is 
based upon previous pilot programs conducted at the local level. The first 
batch of pilot programs dates back to 2008, when emissions trading exchanges 
were set up in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. 11  Subsequently, voluntary 
emissions trading began to emerge in China, with the establishment of a series 
of technical standards and financial channels. Voluntary emissions trading 
recruits participants from industries and organisations who agree to make 
reductions in their carbon emissions rather than being compelled to do so. The 
second type of ETS is mandatory emissions trading, which is currently being 
piloted in four municipalities, two provinces and one local-level city in China 
(Figure 1). A mandatory ETS generally refers to an ETS that requires 
particular sectors (for example, energy-intensive industry sectors such as oil 
refineries, steel works and works producing iron, aluminium, metals, cement, 
lime, and so forth) to participate in the scheme compulsorily in relation to 
particular GHGs, such as CO2.12  
                                                 
8 国家发展和改革委员会 [National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)], 《中华
人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》 [The Outline of the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of 
China] (14 March 2011) <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgh/ghwb/gjjh/P02011091959220857 
5015.pdf>.  
9 Ibid. 
10 The Information Office of the State Council of People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (November 2011) Chinese Government’s 
Official Web Portal <http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-11/22/content_2000272_ 
8.htm>. 
11 International Emissions Trading Association (‘IETA’), ‘The World’s Carbon Markets: A 
Case Study Guide to Emissions Trading’ (IETA, 2013) 3 <http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/ 
EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_china_case_study_september_2013.pdf>. 
12 Current mandatory ETSs are provided for by the Kyoto Protocol, the EU ETS, Australia’s 
Carbon Price Mechanism, the New Zealand ETS, the Swiss ETS, the South Korean ETS, the 
Kazakhstan ETS and some regional schemes (eg, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 
the US, the Western Climate Initiative between the US and Canada, etc). See Anita Talberg 
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Current pilot ETS programs in China could be considered mandatory in 
nature, though they have not been officially defined.13 One major advantage 
of a mandatory ETS over a voluntary one is that it can ensure the achievement 
of the mitigation target, whereas the target set by a voluntary emissions 
trading scheme is more flexible due to the voluntary or elective nature of the 
scheme. Therefore, a mandatory ETS would be more appropriate as a national 
model aimed at targeted mitigations across the economy. On the other hand, 
during the early stages of introducing an ETS in China, a voluntary ETS is 
politically more feasible and likely to gain more support from industries. For 
enterprises not involved in a mandatory ETS, a major benefit of a voluntary 
ETS stems from learning-by-doing and from institutional capacity-building 
within the sectors. Starting out with a voluntary ETS would provide the 
advantage of enabling participants to develop reduction skills and learn 
trading strategies that may be useful as the national ETS model develops in 
the future. Moreover, a successful voluntary ETS should be cost-effective and 
have low administrative costs, since the incentive to pursue voluntary 
emissions trading is inversely proportional to the cost of the action that needs 
to be taken to achieve the reduction target.  
Hence, the Chinese government has chosen to implement voluntary emissions 
trading programs initially to gain experience before launching mandatory ETS 
pilot programs in the above-mentioned seven regions. Based on these pilot 
ETS programs, the government has declared that a national ETS is to be 
established during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan period (2016–2020). 14 
However, due to the uncertainties of carbon prices globally, and in particular 
in the European Union (‘EU’), the operation of such a scheme in China is 
likely to be postponed.  
                                                                                                                    
and Kai Swoboda, Emissions Trading Schemes around the World (6 June 2013) Parliament of 
Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliament 
ary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/EmissionsTradingSchemes#_ftnref25>. 
13 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 13. 
14 IETA, above n 11, 3.  
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Figure 1 Pilot Carbon Trading Schemes in China (Source: Climate Connect)15  
A Establishing a Voluntary ETS in China 
Voluntary emissions trading in CO2 commenced during the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan (2006–2010) period in China.16 In order to formalise the voluntary 
emissions reduction exchange, a number of standards were designed and 
published. For example, the Panda Standard, the first Chinese domestic 
voluntary carbon standard, was established by the China Beijing Environment 
Exchange (‘CBEEX’), BlueNext and Winrock International.17 This standard 
was designed to provide transparency and credibility in the initial Chinese 
carbon market, an aim which is reflected in its project approval process.18 For 
                                                 
15 Climate Connect, China May Introduce Futures Trading of Emission Permits under Pilot 
ETS (4 September 2012) <http://www.climate-connect.co.uk/Home/?q=node/2651>. 
16 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 14; IETA, above n 11, 3. 
17 Version 1.0 of the standard was launched at the 15th meeting of the Conference of Parties in 
Copenhagen in December 2009. See Stockholm Environment Institute (‘SEI’), Panda 
Standard (January 2011) Carbon Offset Research & Education <http://co2offset 
research.org/policy/PandaStandard.html>. 
18 Panda Standard version 1.0 is the reference document of the Panda Standard describing the 
overall organisation of the Panda Standard Association as well as the core procedures of its 
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example, validation of registered Panda Standard projects must be performed 
by an independent third party auditor, who is required to visit on site at least 
once.19 The independent third party auditor is required to perform monitoring, 
verification and certification tasks as well. 20  To ensure the credibility of 
registered Panda Standard projects, verification must be performed at least 
every five years as well as upon any application for renewal of a project’s 
crediting period.21 In addition to the chosen pilot ETS cities and provinces, 
other cities and provinces have also implemented certain voluntary emissions 
trading at the local level. However, the current market performance of these 
voluntary emissions trading schemes scores relatively low due to the lack of 
infrastructure and the shortage of incentives for participating enterprises.22  
Lack of demand has long challenged voluntary emissions trading. During 
2009, the trading volume on the global carbon market was 8.7 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (‘CO2e’), among which the voluntary emissions 
trading volume accounted for only one per cent.23 The voluntary emissions 
trading volume in China is even lower. For example, the CBEEX surpassed its 
peers with a total trade volume of three million tons of CO2e in the first three 
years of operation, but this is still less than the European Climate Exchange’s 
trade volume in a single day. 24  Therefore, provinces and cities are now 
developing further voluntary emissions trading schemes so as to gather 
practical experience and explore appropriate strategies and tactics for better 
market performance. For example, in Shenzhen city, a project that can 
generate verified emission reductions (‘VERs’) based on new-energy vehicles 
rolled out in the public transport sector in the city was implemented during the 
2011 Shenzhen University Games.25 In Hubei province, a voluntary carbon 
                                                                                                                    
project certification scheme. See Panda Standard, What is the Panda Standard? (2010) 
<http://www.pandastandard.org/standard/standard.html>. The full text of Panda Standard 
version 1.0 is available at <http://www.pandastandard.org/downloads/PandaStandard_v1 
ENGLISH.pdf>. 
19 SEI, above n 17. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 14. 
23 李梅影 [Li Meiying], 《自愿减排交易管理办法拟出 减排量将审核签发》[Regulations of 
Voluntary Emissions Trading will be drawn up, Emissions Reduction will be issued through 
verification], 低碳周刊 Carbon Weekly (21世纪经济报道) [21st Century Business Herald], 
22 February 2011, 21. 
24 Haibing Ma, Cloud of Uncertainty Hovers over China’s New Emissions Trading Plans (10 
February 2012) Worldwatch Institute <http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/cloud-of-
uncertainty-hovers-over-chinas-new-emissions-trading-plans/>. 
25 田然 [Tian Ran], 《深圳新能源汽车尝试碳交易》[Shenzhen Tests Carbon Emissions 
Trading on New Energy Vehicles], 深圳特区报 Shenzhen News (online), 31 July 2011 
<http://gov.finance.sina.com.cn/chanquan/2011-08-01/101794.html> A2.   
240 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 2 
emissions trade was finalised in early 2012 whereby 20 000 tons of GHGs 
were purchased by two firms.26 
In the hope of promoting low-carbon pilot projects and providing general 
guidelines to establish a voluntary emissions trading market at the national 
level, the Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission 
Trading in China 27 (‘the Interim Regulation’) was issued by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (‘NDRC’) on 13 June 2012. The 
Interim Regulation outlines the basic management framework, trading 
procedures and supervisory measures of the voluntary trading scheme. In a 
bid to ensure that trading proceeds in an orderly fashion, the Interim 
Regulation establishes a registration and recording system and an information 
disclosure system, and encourages project-based voluntary GHG emissions 
trading. According to this Interim Regulation, projects generating additional 
emission mitigations of six GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6) are 
permitted to participate in a national voluntary ETS governed by the NDRC.28 
However, most project-based voluntary emission exchange markets still 
operate at the provincial or city level, and there is no clear linkage between 
local voluntary ETSs and national voluntary ETSs.29 Therefore, it is essential 
for the government to clarify how to promote voluntary emissions exchange at 
the national level and how to link the local voluntary emissions exchange 
market with the national voluntary market. This might to some extent 
undermine the efficacy of the pilot programs in terms of their suitability for 
national roll out, given that industries would prefer voluntary emissions 
trading to mandatory pilot programs. In this regard, the government needs to 
coordinate the two systems and avoid potential ‘carbon leakage’.30 
                                                 
26  冯欣楠  [Feng Xinnan], 《华中首个自愿性碳交易敲定》[A First Voluntary Carbon 
Emissions Trading Has Been Finalized in Central China], 长江日报  Changjiang News 
(online), 15 January 2012 <http://cjmp.cnhan.com/cjrb/page/1/2012-01-15/5/6694132 
6567299307.pdf> 5. 
27  The Climate Group, The Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission 
Trading in China (July 2012) The Clean Revolution <http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/ 
files/Interim-Regulation-of-Voluntary-Greenhouse-Gases-Emission-Trading-in-China(1). 
pdf>. 
28 Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China, §§ 2, 4–5 
(2012).  
29 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 14. 
30 Carbon leakage refers to the increase of carbon emissions outside a country (or a region) with 
an ambitious carbon pricing regime (eg, an ETS). Dröge et al have identified three channels 
through which carbon leakage is affected by unilateral carbon pricing: (1) global energy 
markets; (2) a firm’s production costs and its operation and investment decisions; and (3) the 
dynamics of technological innovation and policy diffusion. A detailed discussion of this issue 
is provided below in Part III H. See Dröge et al, ‘Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal 
Carbon Prices’ (Climate Strategies, 2009) 16. 
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B Conducting Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot 
Programs 
In 2011, a series of pilot programs for carbon emissions trading operating in a 
similar way to the EU ETS were initiated by the NDRC in four municipalities 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing), two provinces (Hubei and 
Guangdong) and one local-level city Shenzhen (in Guangdong province).31 
Organisations and leadership were strengthened and professional teams were 
allocated funds earmarked for the pilot programs in these designated areas. 
These seven regions, in aggregate, account for 18 per cent of China’s 
population and 28 per cent of its national GDP, but their energy and carbon 
intensity are below China’s national average level.32 Given that an ETS is 
usually a learning-by-doing process, and that learning costs during the early 
stage might be relatively high due to the high uncertainty of economic growth 
and development, the primary reason why these regions were selected as pilot 
regions to conduct pilot ETSs was not their energy and carbon intensity, but 
their capacity to pay for the high learning costs.33 It is generally recognised 
that choosing richer regions as pilot regions first can minimise nationwide 
learning costs in the long run; other regions, especially poorer ones, can run 
ETSs later upon the experience and lessons learned from these pilot regions.34 
However, it would make no sense to evaluate the pilot programs’ success in 
terms of potential GHG emissions reductions if these reductions are being 
tested in low emitting jurisdictions only. Therefore, it is essential for the 
government to consider gradually including more carbon-intensive regions 
into the programs.  
When running carbon emissions trading pilot programs, each of the 
designated areas is obliged to compile an implementation plan for the 
program in its area, defining the overall concept, objectives, key tasks, 
safeguards and project schedules.35 Based on this implementation plan, the 
areas can research and formulate regulations for the program and work out its 
basic rules.36 Policy makers also have to calculate and define overall caps for 
GHG emissions in their regions and work out plans for distributing specific 
                                                 
31  NDRC, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2012) 
<http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/W020121122588539459161.pdf>; 国家发展改革委办公厅 
[General Office of the National Development and Reform Commission], 《国家发展改革委
办公厅关于开展碳排放权交易试点工作的通知》 [Circular of the General Office of the 
NDRC on Launching Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Programs] (29 October 2011) 
<http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2011tz/t20120113_456506.htm>. 
32 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 14. 
33 Ibid 14–15. 
34 Ibid 15. 
35 NDRC, above n 31. 
36 Ibid. 
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emissions targets.37 In a bid to implement the pilot programs more smoothly, 
support systems, such as regulatory, registration and recording systems, and 
trading platforms, have been established and developed in each pilot area.38 
Generally speaking, the pilot ETS at local level adopts a bottom-up approach, 
which complements the top-down approach of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. It 
is worth noting that each pilot program is sui generis, since each 
implementation plan is formulated by local government in line with its local 
conditions. Therefore, there is no common implementation standard for these 
pilot regions. However, in the absence of a common implementation standard, 
the NDRC would not be able to evaluate the efficacy of the pilot programs 
vis-à-vis each other for a national ETS. It is hard to say whether this is a 
design flaw in the NDRC pilot policy, or whether it is deliberate to enable a 
suite of options for the NDRC to choose from. If it is a design flaw, the 
NDRC is expected to take this issue into account and set an appropriate 
common implementation standard for a national roll out.  
III FIRST MOVERS OF PILOT ETSS IN CHINA: BEIJING, 
SHANGHAI AND GUANGDONG 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong launched their pilot programs on 28 March 
2012, 16 August 2012 and 11 September 2012, respectively,39 becoming the 
first movers in designing local ETS implementation plans in China. While 
Beijing announced that its pilot ETS implementation plan had been 
formulated in March 2012, the plan has still not been published.40 Following 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong set out and published their implementation 
plans in July 2012 and September 2012, respectively. 41 On 18 November 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 《七省市排放权交易试点进程》 [Progress on Pilot ETS Programs in Seven Provinces and 
Cities], 低 碳 工 业 网  Low Carbon Industry (online), 22 April 2013 <http://www. 
tangongye.com/news/NewShow.aspx?id=12074>. Since there is no public access to Beijing’s 
pilot ETS implementation plan, materials and data used in this article are based on secondary 
data.  
41 上海市人民政府 [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], 《上海市人民政府关于本市
开展碳排放交易试点工作的实施意见》  [Opinions of Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government on the Implementation of Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Programs in Shanghai] 
(3 July 2012) <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/u26ai 
32789.html>; 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], 《广东省碳
排放权交易试点工作实施方案》 [Implementation Plan for Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading 
Programs in Guangdong Province] (7 September 2012) <http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939 
748/201209/t20120914_343489.html>. 
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2013 during the Warsaw Climate Change Conference, 42 Xie Zhenhua, the 
deputy director of the NDRC, indicated that Shanghai and Beijing would 
launch their pilot ETS programs on 26 November 2013 and 28 November 
2013, respectively.43 Guangdong is also expected to initiate its pilot emissions 
trading program by the end of 2013.44  
A Pilot Period 
Most pilot regions will implement their pilot ETS programs between 2013 and 
2015, with no regulation in place for the post-2015 period, which is 
considered a transition period from the pilot ETS to a nationwide ETS.45 It is 
notable that Guangdong has set a 2020 target, aiming to establish a mature 
intra-provincial ETS as a solid foundation for an inter-provincial ETS.46 This 
implementation plan is divided into three phases — Phase I (2012–2015) is 
the pilot trial period, Phase II (2016–2020) is the trial perfecting period, and 
Phase III (after 2020) is the mature operating period. 47  Although the 
Guangdong 2020 target intends to lay a foundation for a nationwide ETS by 
establishing an intra-provincial ETS, it is still not clear whether the post-2015 
provincial ETS will be compatible with the nationwide ETS, given that no 
official information on a nationwide ETS is available to date. Considering the 
uncertainties and risks involved in the ETS, the NDRC is still waiting to see 
the results of these provincial pilots.  
B Scope of the Cap’s Coverage 
The scope of the cap’s coverage — that is, what emission sources and types of 
GHG emissions will be subjected to the overall cap — differs from region to 
region and depends on criteria such as the sector, and emission load.  
1 Beijing 
According to the Implementation Plan for Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading 
Programs in Beijing (2012–2015) (the ‘Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan’), 
                                                 
42 The 19th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC was held in Warsaw, 
Poland between 11 November 2013 and 22 November 2013. 
43 《解振华：上海北京碳市场本月底将相继启动交易》 [Xie Zhenhua: Carbon Emissions 
Trading Will Be Launched in Shanghai and Beijing at the End of this Month Successively] 
(19 November 2013) <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1119/c70731-23582773.html>. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 15. 
46 Ibid. 
47 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
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enterprises with annual CO2 emissions during 2009–2011 higher than 10 000 
tons, including direct CO2 emissions and indirect CO2 emissions from 
electricity consumption, will be included in the mandatory pilot ETS.48 There 
being no sectoral boundary in this implementation plan, all sectors will be 
included in Beijing’s pilot ETS as long as their annual CO2 emissions exceed 
10 000 tons. Compared to the ETSs with sectoral boundaries (such as the EU 
ETS, which covers only electric utilities, heavy industry and commercial 
aviation), the Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan is more straightforward, 
given that the objective of the benchmark is emissions reductions across the 
board rather than reductions in certain sectors. However, without sectoral 
boundaries, the relevant monitoring, reporting and verification (‘MRV’) work 
would be burdensome. As a result, implementation costs would increase. 
Therefore, including all sectors into the ETS is not economically efficient.  
According to the Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan, tradable emissions 
allowances 49  in this pilot ETS are direct CO2 emissions, indirect CO2 
emissions and Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (‘CCERs’) generated 
from China’s voluntary emissions trading activities.50 It is worth noting that 
the trading of indirect CO2 emissions is a new initiative that has not been 
carried out anywhere in the world yet. The primary reason for including 
indirect CO2 emissions trading in the Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan is that 
more than 60 per cent of the electricity consumed in Beijing is purchased 
outside Beijing. 51  For this reason, indirect CO2 emissions become the 
dominant emissions in Beijing, a fact which cannot be ignored. This is an 
ambitious aspect of the Chinese pilot programs that has the potential to raise 
standards in other countries. However, no further specific details on whether 
                                                 
48 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 15; 李梅影 [Li Meiying], 《北京启动碳排放权交易试点 拟强制纳
入 600单位》 [Beijing Launched Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Programs, Intending to 
Include 600 Enterprises in the Mandatory Pilot ETS], 新浪财经 finance.sina.com.cn (online), 
3 April 2012 <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120403/025611740880.shtml>. 
49  The emissions allowance refers to a unit issued by a central authority (normally the 
government) allowing its holder to emit one emission unit under an emissions trading scheme 
(such as the EU ETS). For example, according to art 3(a) of the Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 
October 2003, the allowance under the EU ETS means “an allowance to emit one tonne of 
carbon dioxide equivalent during a specific period, which shall be valid only for the purposes 
of meeting the requirements of this Directive and shall be transferable in accordance with the 
provisions of this Directive”. See the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, ‘Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003: establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC’ (25 October 2003) Official Journal of 
the European Union L 275/32, L 275/34, Article 3 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0032:EN:PDF>. A detailed discussion on 
emissions allowance distribution is provided below in Part III D. 
50 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 15; 李梅影 [Li Meiying], above n 48. 
51 李梅影 [Li Meiying], above n 48. 
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allowances of direct and indirect CO2 emissions have the same value and 
whether they can be mixed and exchanged freely are given in this 
implementation plan. There is also no explicit definition of the upper 
boundary of the use of CCERs, which is expected to be further studied and set 
by Beijing Municipal Government as soon as possible. 
2 Shanghai 
Unlike Beijing’s Pilot Implementation Plan, Shanghai’s plan sets a clear 
sectoral boundary, stating that enterprises from the industrial sectors of iron 
and steel, petrochemicals, chemicals, non-ferrous metal, electricity, building 
materials, textiles, pulp and paper, rubber and chemical fibre, with annual 
direct and indirect CO2 emissions during 2010–2011 above 20 000 tons will 
be included in the mandatory pilot ETS.52 Enterprises from the non-industrial 
sectors of aviation, ports (shipping), airports, railways, commerce, hotels and 
finance with annual CO2 emissions during 2010–2011 above 10 000 tons will 
be included in this ETS as well.53 Enterprises included in the pilot ETS are 
referred to as ‘pilot enterprises’ hereinafter. It can be seen that there is a clear 
sectoral boundary in Shanghai’s pilot ETS implementation plan, which is 
similar to the EU ETS. With such a sectoral boundary, the implementation 
costs will be reduced. As in the Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan, indirect 
CO2 emissions are included in this program as well, which is an improvement 
compared to other well-established ETSs elsewhere in the world (such as the 
EU ETS).  
According to Shanghai’s pilot ETS implementation plan, other enterprises 
with annual CO2 emissions during 2012–2015 higher than 10 000 tons, that 
are not included in the pilot ETS, are required to report their CO2 emissions 
during the pilot period as a preparatory step for the expansion of pilot 
programs in the next stage.54 These enterprises are hereinafter referred to as 
‘reporting enterprises’. The regulation with regard to reporting enterprises is 
an advantage, given that potential emissions sources are taken into account in 
this program. This aspect is an application of the precautionary principle55, 
which keeps the scope of the cap’s coverage open in the face of emissions 
                                                 
52 上海市人民政府 [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], above n 41. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Briefly stated, the precautionary principle ensures that a substance or activity posing a threat 
to the environment is prevented from adversely affecting the environment, even if there is no 
conclusive scientific proof linking that particular substance or activity to environmental 
damage. See James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, ‘The Precautionary Principle: A 
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment’ 
(1991) 14(1) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 1, 2.  
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uncertainty. For reporting enterprises, this regulation is like the sword of 
Damocles hanging above their heads. The possibility of being covered by the 
ETS will make them pay more attention to their emissions and prompt them to 
take emissions reduction measures.  
In terms of types of GHG emissions subjected to the cap, this pilot program 
focuses exclusively on CO2, which is different from the current EU ETS. In 
addition to CO2 emissions from power plants and a wide range of energy-
intensive industry sectors and commercial airlines, nitrous oxide (‘N2O’) 
emissions from the production of certain acids (such as nitric, adipic, glyoxal 
and glyoxylic acids) and emissions of perfluorocarbons (‘PFCs’) from 
aluminium production are also included in the EU ETS. 56  Although CO2 
makes a significant contribution to global warming, some non-CO2 GHGs, 
such as methane (‘CH4’), N2O and ozone (‘O3’), also have impacts on GHG 
concentrations.57 For this reason, some non-CO2 GHG emissions should also 
be controlled under the same framework as CO2 emissions in a multi-gas 
ETS. However, during the initial phase of the EU ETS (2005–2007), due to 
the EU’s limited experience with emissions trading, the scope of the ETS 
covered only CO2 emissions from large emitters in the power and heat 
generation industry as well as in selected energy-intensive industrial sectors.58 
This scope was expanded during the second period of the EU ETS (2008–
2012), with the inclusion of N2O emissions from the production of certain 
acids and emissions of PFCs from aluminium production. Based on this 
experience, during the initial pilot period, China’s ETS will exclusively cover 
CO2 emissions before including other non-CO2 GHG emissions in the system. 
Tradable emissions allowances in Shanghai’s pilot ETS are CO2 emissions, 
complemented by CCERs and other project-based credits authorised by 
Shanghai local government.59 It can be seen that pilot enterprises are allowed 
to use credits from emissions mitigation mechanisms that are outside the 
ETS’s scope of coverage to offset some of their emissions so as to achieve 
compliance obligations. This measure is usually undertaken by many ETSs 
(for example, the EU ETS) to reduce cost uncertainty.60 
                                                 
56 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (31 October 2013) 
European Commission Climate Action <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/>. 
57  T J Blasing, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations (February 2013) Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html>. 
58  Slobodan Perdan and Adisa Azapagic, ‘Carbon Trading: Current Schemes and Future 
Developments’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 6040, 6043. 
59 上海市人民政府[Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], above n 41. 
60 The uncertainty about future allowance prices may prevent enterprises taking up socially 
desirable and capital-intensive emissions mitigation investments, compelling heavier reliance 
on less capital-intensive but more costly measures, thereby increasing the long-run cost of 
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3 Guangdong 
Similarly to Shanghai’s pilot ETS implementation plan, Guangdong sets out 
the scope of its cap’s coverage during Phase I (2012–2015) upon criteria of 
both sectoral boundaries and emission load, stating that enterprises from the 
industrial sectors of electricity, cement, iron and steel, ceramics, 
petrochemicals, textiles, non-ferrous metal, plastic as well as pulp and paper 
with annual CO2 emissions during 2011–2014 above 20 000 tons (or total 
comprehensive energy consumption above 10 000 tons of standard coal) will 
be included in the mandatory pilot ETS.61 These enterprises included in the 
pilot ETS are hereinafter referred to as ‘emissions-control enterprises’. By the 
end of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, transport and building sectors are 
supposed to be included in this ETS.62 The choice of the years between 2011 
and 2014 differs from Beijing’s and Shanghai’s, indicating that new 
enterprises that have not been included initially before the implementation of 
the pilot ETS by early 2013 may be included in this ETS as late as 2014 as 
long as their CO2 emissions exceed the regulated threshold. 63  Tradable 
allowances in this pilot ETS cover CO2 emissions, supplemented by CCERs 
and other project-based credits authorised by Guangdong province.64  
C System’s Cap Setting 
To date no quantitative cap has been set in the pilot ETS implementation 
plans of these three regions. These implementation plans only indicate the 
objective of setting a total amount target for carbon emissions during the pilot 
period rather than providing specific quantities for caps. Therefore, the 
system’s cap is more an aspiration than a target. Given that pilot ETSs are 
expected to be officially operating from 2013 in all seven regions, it is 
necessary to set the precise cap as soon as possible.  
Setting a reasonable and feasible emissions target — that is, the system’s cap 
— is one of the essential elements of an ETS, since the targeted emissions 
mitigation over the targeted period of time is among the most important 
                                                                                                                    
emission caps. In response, much attention has been given to including ‘cost-containment’ 
mechanisms (eg, credits mechanism) in the ETS to reduce cost uncertainty. Other ‘cost-
containment’ mechanisms in the ETS, such as banking and borrowing, are discussed below. 
See Robert N Stavins, ‘Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Cap-and-trade 
System’ (2008) 24(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 298, 305. 
61 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 15. 
64 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
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determinants of policy cost and its climate benefits.65 As the climate issue is a 
long-term problem, there is significant flexibility to decide when to actually 
carry out measures to achieve emissions reductions. 66  Phased-in targets, 
including short-term targets, medium-term targets and long-term targets, are 
introduced into the policies to deal with this ‘when flexibility’.67 Given that 
the pilot period in most pilot regions lasts only two to three years (2013–
2015), medium-term and long-term targets are not taken into account here. 
Generally speaking, short-term targets with stringent caps may be associated 
with many costs due to the sacrifice of a continued high economic growth 
rate. However, these costs can be avoided by setting annual emission targets 
that gradually increase in stringency.68 In addition, gradually phased-in targets 
provide time to apply advanced technologies in long-term investments. 69 
Therefore, it would be ideal to set gradually phased-in emissions targets in 
these pilot ETS programs. Based on the local level of economic development, 
policymakers in each pilot region could set an emissions target with a 
gradually increasing trajectory of emissions reductions over time. A long-
term, gradually phased-in emissions target could be set by local policymakers 
during the post-2015 period as preparation for a national roll out. In case a 
national ETS is established afterwards, the NDRC should determine how 
many emissions allowances they will issue, which defines the system’s cap 
over the entire country.70 The NDRC along with the Local Development and 
Reform Commissions (‘LDRCs’) should then determine how many emissions 
allowances should be allocated in each region. 
D Emissions Allowance Distribution 
Allowances for CO2 emissions distributed to participating enterprises are 
allocated by the LDRCs based upon the historical emission levels of the 
particular enterprises and types of industry, and according to the development 
stage of the reduction scheme. Distribution methods for allowances are 
                                                 
65 Sergey Paltsev et al, ‘Assessment of US Cap-and-Trade Proposals’ (Working Paper No 
13176, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2007) 3. 
66 Stavins, above n 60, 303. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Adam B Jaffe, Richard G Newell and Robert N Stavins, ‘Energy-Efficient Technologies and 
Climate Change Policies: Issues and Evidence’ (John F Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Climate Issues Brief No 19, 
Resources for the Future, 1999). 
70 The overall volume of GHGs that can be emitted by sources covered by the ETS is limited by 
a ‘cap’ on the number of emissions allowances. Within the cap, enterprises receive or 
purchase emissions allowances which can be traded as needed. See European Commission, 
Allowances and Caps (31 October 2013) European Commission Climate Action 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/>. 
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described in a general manner by local governments in pilot ETS 
implementation plans, which are different from region to region and are 
expected to be further detailed by local governments.  
1 Beijing 
According to the Beijing Pilot Implementation Plan, initial allowances for 
CO2 emissions in 2013 were allocated based upon enterprises’ historical 
emissions during 2009–2011 and were allocated to participating enterprises at 
no cost before December 2012. 71 The initial allocation for CO2 emissions 
allowances in 2014 and 2015 will be based upon enterprises’ CO2 emissions 
of the previous year, and these emissions allowances will be distributed before 
May of every year.72 During the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period, in addition to 
the free emissions allowances, local governments will reserve a small number 
of allowances that will be allocated through auction.73 However, there is no 
clear definition of how these reserved allowances will be used. Some guess 
that they are reserved for new entrants. 74 Furthermore, the cost of carbon 
reduction, which may differ significantly among different industries, is not 
mentioned in the allowances allocation in Beijing’s Pilot Implementation 
Plan. It is obvious that industries with higher carbon reduction costs would 
bear a heavier economic burden than industries with lower carbon reduction 
costs if allowances are allocated equally. This would have a negative impact 
on industries with higher carbon reduction costs; in particular it would 
weaken their competitiveness. Therefore, the cost of carbon reduction in each 
industry should be taken into account when allowances are distributed. For 
example, the EU ETS provides that industries with higher carbon reduction 
costs tend to receive more allowances, whereas fewer allowances are 
allocated to industries with lower carbon reduction costs. This rule could be 
introduced into China’s pilot emissions trading programs. With such a rule, 
the most burdened industries are compensated, which contributes to the 
establishment of consensus on an ETS.    
2 Shanghai 
The initial allocation of CO2 emissions allowances is based on pilot 
enterprises’ historical CO2 emissions during 2009–2011, and each year’s CO2 
emissions allowances during 2013–2015 are allocated in one shot upon a 
specific industry’s allowances allocation approach. 75  A sectoral baseline 
                                                 
71 李梅影 [Li Meiying], above n 48. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 16. 
75 上海市人民政府 [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], above n 41. 
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method may be adopted for allowance distribution in some sectors if it would 
be feasible,76 although there is no definition of the so-called sectoral baseline 
method. During the pilot period, initial allowances of CO2 emissions are 
freely allocated, while auctions may be implemented progressively. 77 
However, no explicit definition of the timetable for implementing auctions 
has been given so far for Shanghai. 
3 Guangdong 
As in Shanghai’s pilot ETS implementation plan, the initial distribution of 
CO2 emissions allowances in Guangdong is based on pilot enterprises’ 
historical CO2 emissions during 2010–2012, and each year’s CO2 emissions 
allowances during 2013–2015 are allocated by the LDRC in one shot 
depending upon the types of industry. 78  Unlike the Beijing and Shanghai 
plans, Guangdong’s pilot ETS implementation plan indicates explicitly that a 
user pays system will be adopted in allowance allocation — that is, with free 
allocation as the main distribution method and auctions as complementary 
during the initial stage. 79  The LDRC will estimate CO2 emissions for 
investment projects of new fixed assets with an annual total energy 
consumption above 10 000 tons of standard coal.80 Based on the estimates of 
these projects and the provincial annual total emissions target, allowances will 
be totally or partially allocated at no cost.81 However, no clear definition of 
the number of allowances reserved for new entrants is given in this 
implementation plan. 
The allowance allocation method in Guangdong’s pilot ETS implementation 
plan is more or less the same as the EU ETS. During the first period of the EU 
ETS (2005–2007), allowances were distributed to entities at almost no cost. 
The number of grandfathered allowances freely allocated to each plant in the 
Member State was determined by each member state’s own National 
Allocation Plan (‘NAP’) according to its national criteria. 82 The NAPs of 
Member States, however, did not reflect the demand of the carbon market 
correctly. Even though the European Commission had substantially revised 15 
NAPs by reducing the overall cap by 4.6 per cent, allocated allowances 
surpassed verified emissions every year during this period, which led to a 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Frank Venmans, ‘A Literature-Based Multi-Criteria Evaluation of the EU ETS’ (2012) 16 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 5493, 5494. 
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drastic drop in price in April 2006, from €29.20/t CO2 on Monday, 24 April to 
a closing spot price of €13.35/t CO2 at the end of that week.83 In contrast to 
the freely allocated grandfathered allowances, less than five per cent of the 
allocations per member state were allowed to be auctioned during this 
period.84 Compared to the first period, the share of auctions increased up to 10 
per cent of the allocations per member state during the second period of the 
EU ETS (2008–2012).85 The ratio of auctions will further increase during the 
third trading period of the EU ETS (2013–2020). Over 40 per cent of the 
allowances are expected to be auctioned from the beginning of the third 
phase, with a gradual increase of auctioning to 100 per cent in 2027.86  
It can be seen that the allowances were distributed in a more generous manner 
(through free allocation) during the early years of the EU ETS, with the 
distribution gradually becoming more rigorous (through, for example, 
auctioning) over time. Auctioning is the most transparent allocation method, 
allowing market participants to obtain the allowances at market price. 87 
Moreover, given that auctioning generates government revenue that can be 
put towards innumerable uses, it is recognised that auctioning has the 
potential to reduce a climate policy’s economy-wide costs. An oft-cited 
example of this is that government revenues raised by selling emissions 
allowances (auction revenue) may sufficiently offset the need to raise revenue 
through distortionary taxes on desirable assets such as capital (corporate 
income, dividends or capital gains) and labour (earned income).88 A GHG 
ETS would yield not only an environmental dividend but also an economic 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, above n 49, L 275/36, 
Art 10. However, only Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania actually held auctions. See Venmans, 
above n 82, 5494–5. 
85 Joachim Schleich, Karoline Rogge and Regina Betz, ‘Incentives for energy efficiency in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2009) 2(1) Energy Efficiency 37, 37–67. 
86  European Commission, Auctioning (18 November 2013) European Commission Climate 
Action <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm>. However, the 
aviation sector will continue to receive freely allocated allowances at 85 per cent. See the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, ‘Directive 2009/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009: amending Directive 2003/87/EC so 
as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
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87 European Commission, above n 86. 
88  Anne E Smith, Martin T Ross and W David Montgomery, ‘Implications of Trading 
Implementation Design for Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Carbon Permit Allocations’ 
(Working Paper, Charles River Associates, 2002) 3. 
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one, a phenomenon referred to as the ‘double dividend’.89 Bovenberg and 
Goulder’s studies show that ‘recycling’ auction revenue through reducing 
personal income tax rates could offset 40 to 50 per cent of the economy-wide 
social costs that a cap would impose if allowances were freely allocated.90 
However, it is not appropriate to auction all the allowances during the early 
stage. Although free allocation of allowances would reduce the potential 
efficiency improvements from revenue-recycling, which could be realised by 
auctioning, it could affect the distribution of a climate policy’s economic 
impacts by redistributing a cap’s economic burden. Allocating more free 
allowances to the most affected and burdened entities (for example, industries 
with higher carbon reduction costs) is an example of this. However, given that 
freely allocating all allowances in perpetuity to affected entities would 
significantly overcompensate them for their financial losses in aggregate,91 
the share of allowances that are freely allocated should diminish over time 
until there is no free distribution into the program. Therefore, it is reasonable 
and feasible to distribute the allowances freely at the initial stage of the 
program, moving steadily to 100 per cent distribution through auction over 
time. 
E ‘Cost-Containment’ Mechanisms 
Allowance banking and borrowing are often used as ‘cost-containment’ 
mechanisms to reduce the undesirable consequences of cost uncertainty. 92 
Generally speaking, borrowing93 is prohibited during the pilot period in these 
                                                 
89 The concept of the ‘double dividend’ is related to environmental taxes (eg, the carbon tax). 
Given that auction revenues from the ETS function similarly to revenues from environmental 
taxes, the double dividend exists in both systems. For more discussion about the double 
dividend, see Lawrence H Goulder, ‘Environmental Taxation and the “Double Dividend”: A 
Reader’s Guide’ (1995) 2(2) International Tax Policy Forum 157, 157–83; Don Fullerton and 
Gilbert E Metcalf, ‘Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You 
Really Expect Something for Nothing?’ (1998) 73(1) Chicago-Kent Law Review 221, 221–56. 
90 A Lans Bovenberg and Lawrence H Goulder, ‘Confronting Industry-Distributional Concerns 
in US Climate-Change Policy’ (Discussion Paper No 6, Institute on the Economics on the 
Environment and Sustainability, 2003). 
91  Lawrence H Goulder, ‘Confronting the Adverse Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement 
Policies: What Does it Cost?’ in Michael A Toman (ed), Climate Change Economics and 
Policy: An RFF Anthology (Resources for the Future, 2001) 125, 125–33; Smith et al, above 
n 88, 4; Bovenberg and Goulder, above n 90.  
92 Allowance banking and borrowing under an ETS provide participating enterprises with the 
flexibility to shift their emission reductions obligations across periods when confronting 
unexpected and temporarily high or low costs. 
93 The borrowing of allowances allows participating enterprises to under-comply with their 
emission reductions obligations and use (borrow) allowances that will be issued in future 
years by shifting the deficit forward to the obligations in subsequent periods. See Robert N 
Stavins, ‘Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments’ in Karl-Göran 
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pilot regions, given that the pilot period is relatively short and there are too 
many uncertainties for the post-2015 nationwide ETS, which is expected to be 
linked with regional ETSs. However, banking 94  is allowed under specific 
conditions within the pilot phase. 
According to Beijing’s Pilot Implementation Plan, banking of allowances is 
allowed but no allowances are valid after 2015.95 The purpose of this rule is to 
boost the liquidity of allowances, given that allowances allocated to 
participating enterprises may not be appropriate during the initial stage and 
the long-term possession of these allowances may have side effects on the 
future carbon market. However, this rule will discourage participating 
enterprises from creating tradable allowances through low-carbon and energy-
saving technologies, since these allowances will become invalid in the post-
2015 period. Therefore, further studies on the definition of allowance banking 
and the period during which it will be available are necessary in the near 
future. 
There is only one general regulation controlling allowances banking and 
borrowing in Shanghai’s pilot ETS implementation plan, allowing banking to 
go beyond the end of the year.96 However, details of the use of allowances 
after 2015 are not given in this pilot ETS implementation plan, causing 
uncertainties for the post-2015 carbon market. 
As with Beijing and Shanghai, no allowances are valid after 2015 in 
Guangdong’s pilot ETS program, even though banking is allowed within the 
pilot period.97 Further precise details on the definition and use of post-2015 
banking are expected to be given by LDRC. 
Regulations that have been made concerning banking of allowances in China 
are similar to those applying during the first period of the EU ETS (2005–
2007). To deal with the price crash caused by over-allocated allowances 
during the first period of the EU ETS, banking of the allowances within the 
first period was allowed, but not during the time between the first period and 
                                                                                                                    
Mäler and Jeffery R Vincent (eds), Handbook of Environmental Economics, Volume 1: 
Environmental Degradation and Institutional Responses (Elsevier Science and Technology, 
May 2003) 355–435. 
94  The banking of allowances allows participating enterprises to undertake extra emission 
reductions (over-comply) earlier and save (bank) unused allowances for use in future years. 
See Stavins, ibid. 
95 李梅影 [Li Meiying], above n 48. 
96 上海市人民政府 [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], above n 41. 
97 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
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the second period.98 Consequently, the carbon price plunged to its lowest level 
at the end of the first period, ending at €0.08/t CO2 by the end of 2007. The 
lesson of Europe should be learned by China’s pilot ETS programs. Should a 
post-2015 national ETS be established in China, banking of allowances 
should be permitted between the pilot ETS programs ceasing and the national 
ETS coming into force. 
F Monitoring, Reporting, Verification  
Monitoring systems which enable the credible measurement, reporting and 
verification of carbon emissions trading activities are critical for the 
successful implementation of an ETS.99 According to the Chinese regions’ 
pilot ETS implementation plans, MRV works in all three pilot regions are 
conducted by designated third parties assigned by local governments. It is 
obvious that local enterprises will usually be preferred as MRVs by local 
governments, since they are more familiar with the local enterprises 
participating in these pilot ETS programs. Strictly speaking, these local 
enterprises preferred by local governments are not third parties — that is, 
parties at arm’s length from government — but more like government 
appointees. This could have repercussions for the efficacy of MRV works. 
Moreover, there could also be problems when pilot ETS programs are 
transformed into a national ETS where there is no ‘local’ preference. 
Therefore, an independent third party without any local government 
preference should be responsible for MRV works. For example, a group of 
independent third party auditors could be designated by the NDRC and then 
be sent to local regions to undertake MRV works separately.  
The reporting system is established in Beijing’s Pilot Implementation Plan, 
indicating that all mandatory participating enterprises are required to report 
their energy consumption and emission factors data and submit their verified 
annual CO2 emissions to LDRC by March of the following year, which will 
serve as the basis for the new allocation of allowances that will be issued in 
May of the following year. 100  The Beijing municipal government is also 
considering establishing administrative measures on carbon emissions trading 
in Beijing to define the rights and obligations of the third-party verifier before 
                                                 
98 Venmans, above n 82, 5494. 
99 UN-REDD Programme, Measurement Reporting and Verification (26 October 2013) 
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100 Tuerk et al, above n 3, 16. 
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the Carbon Emissions Trading Market Regulation in Beijing is released by 
2015.101 
The establishment of MRV is explicitly put forward in Shanghai’s pilot ETS 
implementation plan in a general manner, without any concrete provisions. 
According to this implementation plan, both pilot enterprises and reporting 
enterprises are required to report their CO2 emissions of last year within the 
stipulated time; these reports will be verified by a third-party verifier.102 
Compared to MRV in Beijing and Shanghai, MRV in Guangdong is more 
precisely regulated in its pilot ETS implementation plan, requiring both 
emissions-control enterprises and industrial sector enterprises with annual 
CO2 emissions during 2011–2014 above 10 000 tons (or with annual total 
energy consumption above 5000 tons of standard coal) to report their CO2 
emissions.103 Key enterprises from the transport and building sectors will be 
required to conduct reporting activities as well as research. 104 In a bid to 
establish the verification system for CO2 emissions of emissions-control 
enterprises, third-party verifiers with relevant qualifications are trained and 
authorised by local government to verify the information of CO2 emissions 
reported by emissions-control enterprises. 105  As a convenience for 
participating enterprises and third-party verifiers, a relevant Electronic 
Information System is expected to be instituted to establish MRV in 
Guangdong.106 
Compared to the general and rough regulations in relation to MRV in these 
pilot Chinese ETS implementation plans, MRV provisions in the EU ETS are 
more detailed and explicit. The annual MRV procedure and processes 
connected to the procedure are referred to as the ‘compliance cycle’ of the EU 
ETS.107 In accordance with the EU ETS Directive, the European Commission 
has adopted guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions.108 
During the third period of the EU ETS (2013–2020), the EU ETS MRV is 
required to comply with two new EC regulations — one pertaining to 
monitoring and reporting and the other specific to verification and 
                                                 
101 李梅影 [Li Meiying], above n 48. 
102 上海市人民政府 [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government], above n 41. 
103 广东省人民政府 [People’s Government of Guangdong Province], above n 41. 
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106 Ibid. 
107 European Commission, Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of EU ETS Emissions (31 
October 2013) European Commission Climate Action <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
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accreditation.109 In order to encourage more harmonised and cost-effective 
application of the regulations in all Member States, the electronic templates 
for monitoring plans have been published by the EC. 110  These measures, 
which could be introduced to China’s ETS, have improved the administrative 
efficiency and harmony of MRV. If China takes advantage of the experience 
from the EU ETS MRV, the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions in 
China would be more robust, transparent, consistent and accurate, which is 
essential for the effective operation of the ETS.  
G Trading Platform 
Carbon emissions trading activities are conducted through trading platforms, 
which are clearly designated by local governments. For example, the trading 
platform in Shanghai is the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange 
(SEEX), 111 while Guangdong’s trading platform is the Guangzhou Carbon 
Emission Rights Exchange.112 The trading platform in Beijing will be set up 
in the Administrative Measures on Carbon Emissions Trading in Beijing.113 
Only Guangdong clearly elaborates its intention to explore inter-provincial 
carbon emissions trading mechanisms, which will link up Guangdong’s ETS 
with ETSs in other provinces, although no further data are given in its pilot 
ETS implementation plan. With regard to inter-provincial carbon emissions 
trading, China could also benefit from the EU ETS’s successful experience 
with interstate carbon emissions trading. 
H Issues concerning Competitiveness and Carbon 
Leakage 
Competitiveness and carbon leakage are two major issues to be addressed 
when discussing a cap-and-trade system or ETS. Given that these factors may 
have negative impacts on the economy and environment, policymakers 
usually pay more attention to them when designing and implementing ETSs. 
However, no specific and explicit guidance with regard to these issues is 
given in the pilot ETS implementation plans of the Chinese regions. This is 
not because they are ignored by policymakers, but because these issues are 
unlikely to emerge during the pilot phase. For one thing, both local 
governments and participating enterprises believe that first movers should 
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have first-mover advantages in the development of a low-carbon economy 
once a nationwide ETS is implemented. These future advantages will 
stimulate their enthusiasm to conduct pilot ETSs actively. Enterprises which 
are not concerned about effects on their competitiveness will tend to be 
positive and optimistic.  
On another issue, some sources have indicated that the NDRC has signalled 
that a nationwide ETS will be implemented by the Chinese government 
during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan period (2016–2020).114 Pilot regions’ 
governments as well as participating enterprises all accept this assumption 
which, if it is correct, would tend to minimise negative effects on inter-
provincial competitiveness, and possible carbon leakage, given that no 
enterprises can avoid the ETS after 2015. 115 Given the great uncertainties 
concerning carbon markets at home and abroad, and the on-going downturn in 
the EU’s carbon market, whether China will establish its nationwide ETS in 
the near future cannot be predicted. In this climate of uncertainty, 
countermeasures and solutions responding to these issues are expected to be 
further studied and put forward by Chinese policymakers.  
Theoretically, there are three channels through which carbon leakage is 
affected by unilateral carbon pricing: (1) the energy price channel or fossil 
fuel channel; (2) the trade leakage channel or competitiveness leakage 
channel; and (3) the technology and policy spill-over channel. 116 The first 
channel is closely linked with energy markets and macroeconomic effects. It 
is assumed that a price-induced reduction in fossil fuel demand caused by 
ambitious environmental policies (such as the ETS) inside a large region 
(such as the EU) would reduce world prices for oil, gas and coal, which would 
lead to higher demand and consumption in the parts of the world without such 
environmental policies and, therefore, increase carbon emissions outside of 
this region.117 The second channel is referred to as the trade leakage channel 
(or the competitiveness leakage channel), 118  since the impacts of carbon 
pricing on firms’ production costs are closely connected with the 
                                                 
114 Carbon Market Watch, ‘China’s Pilot Emissions Trading Systems’ (2013) 3 Carbon Market 
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competitiveness of energy-intensive and trade-exposed ETS industries. With 
emissions restrictions from the ETS, energy-intensive and trade-exposed ETS 
industries may lose competitiveness. As a result, they would be expected to 
change their operation and investment decisions (for example, increase 
emission-intensive production outside the ETS), which would generate carbon 
leakages outside the ETS regions. The third channel is referred to as the 
technology and policy spill-over channel119 based on the Porter Hypothesis.120 
It is assumed that stringent climate policy can induce the development of low-
carbon technologies that make production processes and products more 
efficient, raising the competitiveness of companies operating in international 
markets.121 With the diffusion and proliferation of low-carbon technologies 
around the world, carbon-intensity of production in non-ETS regions would 
be lowered and foreign emissions could be reduced accordingly. In addition to 
technology spill-overs, the ETS as a role model of climate policy will be 
diffused outside as well and, therefore, mitigate more emissions outside the 
ETS region. As opposed to the first two channels, which would cause carbon 
leakage, the technology and policy spill-over channel could decrease 
emissions outside the ETS region and offset carbon leakage, decreasing global 
net emissions to some extent. Therefore, technology and policy spill-over 
would be an appropriate method to address the issue of carbon leakage.  
From the perspective of practice, the experience of carbon leakage in the EU 
ETS could inform China’s ETS programs. Although recent ex ante model 
estimates of carbon leakage and competitiveness loss vary considerably,122 
most ex post studies of the EU ETS indicate that an ETS does not significantly 
influence competitiveness and the EU ETS has not, so far, triggered 
observable carbon leakage outside the EU.123 In general, carbon leakage did 
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not occur through the trade channel during the first phase of the EU ETS. This 
result is not surprising, given that the ETS industries were on average 100 per 
cent grandfathered in during the first phase of the EU ETS, and the mean 
profitability of ETS plants was therefore increased. 124  Meanwhile, over-
allocation for industrial sectors during the first phase lowered the risk of 
carbon leakage outside the EU as well. Although over-allocation did not occur 
during the second phase of the EU ETS, a significant dip in carbon prices 
caused by the Global Financial Crisis reduced the cost of emissions inside the 
EU and did not decrease the world energy price as well. Thus, carbon leakage 
would not be able to occur through either the trade leakage channel or the 
energy price channel. Moreover, low-carbon technology development induced 
by the EU ETS also has a long-term positive effect on the competitiveness of 
ETS industries, providing first-mover advantages for European producers, 
which can effectively control carbon leakage that occurs through the 
competitiveness leakage channel. Although carbon leakage was lower than 
observable during the first and second periods of the EU ETS, continuous 
monitoring is required given that leakage is difficult to detect over a short 
time frame.125 Considering that free allocation will gradually be displaced in 
the future by auctioning, and that present anti-leakage measures are costly,126 
carbon leakage may present new challenges during the third phase of the EU 
ETS. In response, scholars are proposing a continuous analysis of carbon 
leakage. For example, Reinaud emphasises that it is important to analyse 
carbon leakage from the perspectives of the cost pass-through capacity, trade 
flows and investment decisions, which are three important indicators of 
carbon leakage.127 Given that carbon leakage is affected by carbon pricing 
through the above-mentioned three channels, it is essential to understand how 
to prevent and control carbon leakage through the energy price channel and 
the trade leakage channel, while spreading climate policies and low-carbon 
technologies across the world to eliminate carbon leakage. 
                                                                                                                    
in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: An Empirical Assessment for Germany’ (2008) 36(1) 
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IV PILOT ETSS WITH OFFICIAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS: 
TIANJIN, HUBEI AND SHENZHEN 
Following Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, Tianjin and Hubei published 
their pilot ETS implementation plans in February 2013. In June 2013, the 
NDRC approved the pilot ETS implementation plan in Shenzhen. Following 
the approval of Shenzhen’s implementation plan, China’s first carbon trading 
market was launched in Shenzhen on 18 June 2013. 
A Tianjin 
The Implementation Plan for Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Programs in 
Tianjin (‘Tianjin’s Pilot Implementation Plan’) was published by Tianjin 
Municipal People’s Government on 5 February 2013.128 Before this official 
implementation plan was issued, a series of policies had been implemented to 
pave the way for ETS in Tianjin. One of the most important policies is the 
General Plan for the Development of Emissions Trading Market of Tianjin 
released by the Tianjin Development and Reform Commission on 18 June 
2011,129 providing the means of establishing an integrated ETS that includes 
major pollutants (such as SO2 and COD) and CO2. Furthermore, concrete 
actions were introduced to put CO2 emissions trading on track as well. For 
example, the Energy Efficiency Trading Implementation Plan for Civil 
Building in Tianjin was issued on 20 January 2010,130 becoming the first legal 
instrument of the ETS in the field of civil building in China.  
According to Tianjin’s Pilot Implementation Plan, enterprises from the sectors 
of iron and steel, chemicals, electricity, heating power, petrochemicals, oil 
                                                 
128 天津市人民政府办公厅 [General Office of Tianjin Municipal People’s Government], 《天
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and gas exploitation, as well as civil building, with annual CO2 emissions 
since 2009 higher than 20 000 tons, will be included in the initial pilot 
period. 131  This market scope will be expanded gradually upon the 
development of Tianjin’s as well as the nationwide carbon markets.  
An absolute cap is required to be set during the pilot period, although no 
quantitative cap is given in this implementation plan. The initial allocation of 
allowances during 2013–2015 is based on the annual total emissions target 
and historical emissions of participating enterprises. 132  Allowances are 
allocated freely to participating enterprises during the pilot period, while 
auctioning is being explored for future allocation.133 
An MRV system has been established to facilitate the pilot ETS program in 
Tianjin, and MRV works are conducted by designated third parties assigned 
by the government of Tianjin.134 The trading platform is the Tianjin Emission 
Rights Exchange (‘TEREX’), through which carbon emissions trading in 
Tianjin can be conducted in an open, fair and impartial manner.135 First, it 
helps enterprises to manage their environmental risks and disclose 
environmental information. Second, in order to ensure fair trading, TEREX 
provides transparent trading prices to each participant. Finally, the credibility 
of the environmental trading market is assured through standardised trading 
procedures.  
B Hubei 
The Implementation Plan for Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Programs in 
Hubei Province (‘Hubei’s Pilot Implementation Plan’) was released by the 
government of Hubei Province on 18 February 2013,136 dividing this pilot 
program into four phases. Research work on the pilot ETS as well as the 
preparatory work were undertaken during Phase I (December 2011–June 
2012). Phase II (July 2012–June 2013) was the launching period, and Hubei’s 
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Pilot Implementation Plan was accomplished during this period. The pilot 
ETS program was scheduled to be formally launched in August 2013, 
bringing in the operation period (Phase III) from August 2013 to June 2015.137 
During Phase IV (July 2015–December 2015), the pilot program will be 
assessed and improved to pave the way for a nationwide ETS. 
According to this implementation plan, enterprises from key industries with 
annual total energy consumption during 2010–2011 higher than 60 000 tons 
of standard coal will be included in the mandatory pilot ETS program in 
Hubei. 138  In addition to these enterprises, corporations with CCERs, the 
Carbon Emission Rights Bank in Hubei and other eligible corporations 
volunteering to participate in carbon emissions trading are encouraged to take 
part in this pilot ETS program.139  
At the pilot stage, the trading of Hubei’s pilot ETS focuses exclusively on 
CO2, while other GHGs will be included in this ETS gradually with the 
development of the pilot program.140 Tradable allowances in this pilot ETS 
consist of freely allocated carbon emissions allowances and CCERs 
(including forest carbon sinks) generated in Hubei province. 141  As in 
Shanghai, auctions of allowances may later be implemented progressively 
upon the performance of the pilot program, although no explicit timing is 
given in this implementation plan. 142  As far as CCERs are concerned, a 
maximum level is set by the implementation plan, although the precise ratio is 
not given in this implementation plan.143 Generally, the price of allowances is 
influenced by the carbon market. However, in order to prevent abnormal 
volatility in the carbon market during the initial period of the pilot program, 
administrative means are adopted to adjust the carbon market when 
necessary.144 
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Designated third parties are assigned by local government to conduct MRV. 
In fact, Hubei has a great deal of experience with MRV, a fact which could 
effectively support the pilot ETS program there. For example, in Wuhan, the 
capital city of Hubei province, the Guidelines for GHG MRV were published 
by a carbon emissions trading association on 23 September 2011, and 
constituted the first local standard for MRV.145 Owing to these Guidelines, 
20 000 tons of GHG were successfully purchased by two export-oriented 
manufacturing enterprises in Wuhan in September 2011, this purchase 
becoming the first carbon neutral trade in central China. 146  The Hubei 
Emission Rights Exchange Centre will be established to provide a trading 
platform for both voluntary and pilot emissions trading programs in Hubei 
province.147 
C Shenzhen 
Unlike Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, which are ‘municipality 
cities’, Shenzhen is a ‘local city’, which is part of Guangdong province. It is 
necessary to clarify the relationship among municipalities, local cities and 
provinces selected to conduct pilot ETSs. From the political perspective, 
municipalities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, have 
administrative powers equal to those of the provinces in China. In practice, 
leaders from municipalities have a greater chance of being promoted to a 
higher administrative level of the central government than leaders from 
provinces. Local cities, such as Shenzhen, belong to provinces and have less 
administrative power than municipalities and provinces, which also have rural 
administrative areas.148 Therefore, China consists of a pyramidal hierarchy of 
national administrative regions, with municipalities at the top and local cities 
at the bottom. Power differences among these regions may affect the efficacy 
of implementation of these pilot ETS programs. However, as opposed to 
normal local cities, Shenzhen is one of the Special Economic Zones (‘SEZs’) 
in mainland China. As selected cities located in mainland China, SEZs have 
more free market-oriented economic policies and flexible governmental 
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measures than the rest of mainland China. 149  Considering the specific 
economic and social status of Shenzhen, it has been selected and separated 
from Guangdong province to conduct its own pilot ETS program, which could 
differ from that of Guangdong province. 
On 19 September 2012, the Shenzhen local government held a press 
conference to release information about the progress of preparatory work on 
its pilot ETS program and to introduce extraordinary measures concerning the 
pilot program.150 The details of the pilot ETS design were that around 800 
enterprises from 26 sectors with annual CO2 emissions above 20 000 tons 
were planned to be included in the mandatory pilot ETS program; these 
enterprises accounted for 54 per cent of total CO2 emissions of Shenzhen in 
2010.151 Unlike other pilot regions, Shenzhen has no large emitters (such as 
iron and steel as well as cement industries); therefore more enterprises are 
included in the pilot ETS so as to ensure that more than half of the total CO2 
emissions are included in this pilot program. The Shenzhen local government 
has completed the allowances allocation plan — the core task in the 
establishment of a carbon market — indicating that most allowances will be 
allocated freely during the initial period, with progressive auctioning until 100 
per cent of the allowances have been auctioned.152 As in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangdong, designated third parties are assigned to conduct MRV works, 
ensuring the reliability, credibility and quality of the verification. 153  The 
trading platform in Shenzhen is the SEEX, the capital of which has been 
increased from 15 million RMB to 300 million RMB, making it the emission 
rights exchange with the largest registered capital in China.154 
In June 2013, the Implementation Plan for Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading 
Programs in Shenzhen (‘Shenzhen’s Pilot Implementation Plan’) was 
approved by the NDRC. On 18 June 2013, Shenzhen launched its pilot carbon 
trading scheme, becoming the first city formally to launch the pilot carbon 
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emissions trading program in China. 155  According to Shenzhen’s Pilot 
Implementation Plan, 635 industrial enterprises across the most energy-
intensive sectors are included in its pilot ETS, accounting for 40 per cent of 
the city’s total GHG emissions. 156  The 635 industrial enterprises will be 
issued 100 million emissions allowances over the next three years (2013–
2015), with 33.2 million allowances issued this year.157 On the first day of 
trading at the SEEX, an aggregate of 21 112 tons of emissions allowances 
were traded among participating industries in the spot market, with the price 
ranging from CN¥28 to CN¥30 (equivalent to US$4.6 to US$4.9) per ton.158 
The initially low price of emissions allowances reached an all-time peak of 
CN¥130.9 (US$21) on 17 October 2013, surpassing the California Carbon 
Allowance (CCA) price which closed at about US$12 on the same day.159 The 
price of allowances has been continuously increasing since early October, 
with an 86 per cent increase from CN¥70.6 (US$11.5) on 8 October 2013 to 
CN¥130.9 (US$21) on 17 October 2013 (Figure 2).160  
Given that China’s pilot emissions trading programs are broadly designed 
upon the EU ETS, it is to be feared that a similar drawback of over-allocation 
of emissions allowances and the resulting collapse in carbon price will be 
encountered by China as well. However, the trading scenario up till now has 
not confirmed previous apprehensions. Although the carbon price keeps on 
increasing, the trading volume at the SEEX remains within a narrow range, 
with daily average trades of 211 tons in October 2013.161 The relatively low 
trading volume arises from the uncertainty of the ETS in China. First, it is still 
uncertain which carbon pricing regime the Chinese government will adopt in 
the future. Therefore, it is difficult for investors to make a decision among 
various alternatives (such as a carbon tax). Moreover, there is still no clear 
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guideline on how the CCERs will be included in the ETS, making the carbon 
price more uncertain.  
 
Figure 2: Price of Carbon Emissions Allowances at Shenzhen Emissions 
Exchange (Source: Climate Connect)162 
V THE PILOT ETS WITHOUT OFFICIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN: CHONGQING 
At the time of writing,163 there is only one pilot region — that is, Chongqing 
— without an official ETS implementation plan; the local pilot ETS 
implementation plan has not yet been published.164 Chongqing is preparing 
for the establishment of a pilot ETS, stating that its implementation plan has 
already been finalised and will be submitted for national approval; it is 
expected to be published soon.165 The chief of the LDRC in Chongqing has 
disclosed that enterprises included in the pilot ETS in Chongqing will mainly 
focus on six high energy-consumption industries, including the electrolytic 
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aluminium, iron alloy, calcium carbide, caustic soda, cement, as well as iron 
and steel industries. 166  Furthermore, credits generated from forest carbon 
sinks will be used in the pilot ETS in Chongqing. Compared with measures 
taken in the other pilot regions, this is a creative measure.167 
VI THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ETS IN CHINA 
Since the Beijing Municipal Government released its pilot ETS 
implementation plan in March 2012, the rest of the pilot regions have 
accomplished their own implementation plans successively, or will finish the 
implementation plan soon. According to most pilot ETS implementation 
plans, 2013 is the commencement year of the pilot ETS programs in China, 
although only Shenzhen has launched its pilot ETS program to date. It is 
expected that Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong will launch their pilot ETS 
programs by the end of 2013. According to the statement of the NDRC, the 
pilot ETS programs are expected to end in 2015, being replaced by a 
nationwide ETS during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan period (2016–2020).168 
However, it is still not clear whether a nationwide ETS can be successfully 
established from 2015, or even later, through the bottom-up pilot ETS 
programs, given that too many uncertainties and difficulties persist. First, pilot 
ETS programs vary from area to area, ranging from cap setting to allowances 
allocation. Therefore, cross-regional emission rights exchange will be difficult 
and complicated to operate. Second, the experience/learning period for the 
pilot ETSs — 2013 to 2015 — is relatively short, leaving policymakers with 
too little time to accumulate sufficient information. It is obvious that the 
current pilot ETS programs at the local level are still immature, and need to be 
further refined by policymakers. Policymakers who attempt to refine them 
will be confronted by substantial challenges due to their lack of experience 
with the more sophisticated requirements of an ETS — in terms of emissions 
data, administrative capacity and solid regulatory frameworks, which are 
integral to a robust emissions trading system.169 This shortcoming might be 
overcome through a study of established ETSs, such as those in Europe, the 
United Kingdom, California and New Zealand, among others; international 
data on the operation of these systems is available. However, due to national 
differences, it may not be useful to follow recommendations based on 
comparative analysis. It will take time to test these recommendations. Third, 
from an international perspective, the downturn of the EU’s carbon market 
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serves as a signal to participating enterprises that their mitigation efforts may 
not bring the expected profits, dampening their enthusiasm for creating 
emissions allowances. Therefore, industry stakeholders may oppose the 
implementation of the ETS, which would present more political challenges to 
enacting such an environmental policy. 
Regardless of the abovementioned uncertainties and difficulties, even though 
a nationwide ETS may eventually be established as expected, there will still 
be a variety of problems in practice. First of all, it will be necessary to decide 
whether the nationwide ETS will be a unique trading system or whether it will 
just include different local ETSs. As discussed above, the liquidity of 
emissions allowances — that is, the degree to which large transactions of 
emissions allowances can be carried out in a timely fashion with a minimal 
impact on the price of allowances — may be restricted due to the different 
standards and requirements of local ETSs in different regions. Inconsistency 
in monitoring and verification would also erode the interchangeability of 
carbon credits from different regions and sectors. Therefore, a trading system 
with unified standards will be needed to ensure inter-provincial emissions 
allowances exchange. However, the establishment of unified criteria would 
present substantial challenges, since there are large differences in economic 
structures, growth rates, energy consumption and carbon emissions across 
China’s provinces. Further, it is feared that a nationwide ETS with unified 
standards would worsen China’s already substantial regional social and 
economic disparities.  
Secondly, the nature of the nationwide ETS needs to be further clarified 
before it is established. Policymakers need to determine whether this 
nationwide ETS is to be voluntary or mandatory like the pilot ETS programs 
in the seven regions. They also need to identify whether previous pilot regions 
are to be allowed a transitional period. The articulation point between pilot 
ETS programs and the nationwide ETS needs to be further explored by the 
Chinese government in the near future. Moreover, policymakers need to 
determine whether the emissions cap should be absolute or intensity-based. 
An absolute emissions cap would make emissions mitigation predictable, but 
it would conflict with the continued rapid GDP growth in China, since 
emissions are closely connected with the speed of economic growth. 170 
However, no consensus has been reached on this issue.171   
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Although the Chinese government has shown its willingness to launch a 
forthcoming nationwide ETS after 2015, the prospects of the nationwide ETS 
in China are still not good, given that carbon trading in China is still in its 
infancy, with much experimentation but few results to date. A variety of 
issues, such as the system’s cap setting, the co-ordination between different 
pilot programs and the integration of the Chinese carbon market with 
international trading schemes, among other things, need to be progressively 
addressed by the Chinese government in the next few years. The success or 
failure of the experimental pilot ETS programs will, to a large extent, 
determine the future development of carbon markets in China. 
An answer to the question posed at the beginning of this article –– which 
mode of launching a nationwide ETS in China should the Chinese 
government choose, the revolutionary or the evolutionary? –– may now be 
attempted. The revolutionary mode would establish a nationwide ETS in 
China in a quick and direct manner; however, this simple and crude way could 
be expected to sacrifice the individuality of different regions. As discussed 
above, the pilot ETS implementation plans are not detailed enough, with 
many regulations needing to be more precisely defined by local governments. 
For example, instead of just putting forward the objective of auctioning 
allowances, the government should state the timetable for the auctions more 
explicitly. Furthermore, experience from past experiments with other kinds of 
pollution emissions trading (such as SO2) and from international ETSs could 
be applied in China’s pilot ETS programs. For example, the detailed and 
explicit guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions of the 
EU ETS could inform China’s pilot ETS programs. However, a learning-by-
doing process is time consuming.  
Finally and most importantly, the most fundamental question concerning the 
launching of an ETS in China is whether this strong market-based instrument 
can function well in the absence of a mature free-market economy.172 In other 
words, is a free-market economy a prerequisite for the implementation of an 
ETS? This issue is especially important in China. After more than three 
decades of market economy-oriented reform, China today is closer than ever 
to a real market economy.173 However, it remains different from a mature 
free-market economy in that the government still plays an important role in 
the economy through state-owned enterprises, such as China National 
Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec, which continue to control the country’s 
economic lifeline. Furthermore, heavy government control and intervention 
are frequent, and corruption and a culture of distrust in business are 
widespread. All these factors would have profound implications for the 
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operation of a carbon market, even if the ETS is well designed. Taking these 
factors into account, it is better to cultivate this embryonic carbon market 
cautiously rather than exposing it, entirely and directly, to an untested, or 
insufficiently tested, new environmental policy instrument. In other words, the 
‘crossing the river by groping for stones’ spirit — that is, the mild 
evolutionary approach — might be more appropriate for the current carbon 
market in China. The term of the current pilot ETS programs at the local level 
should be extended step by step before a mandatory nationwide ETS is 
formally initiated.  
